PDB Afternoon Bulletin | September 24th, 2026: China’s Secret Lifeline to Iran’s War Effort Exposed & Trump-Xi Summit

Mike Baker (0:11)

It's Thursday, the 24th of September, welcome to the PDB Afternoon Bulletin. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. First up, new reporting reveals just how much China is helping keep Iran's war machine running. From drone and missile components, to satellite imagery and financial lifelines. And later in the show, as Beijing's support for the Iranian regime comes under new scrutiny, President Xi Jinping is in Washington, DC for talks with President Trump on Taiwan, trade, and the future of US-China relations. But first, today's afternoon spotlight.

We've been reporting on concerns that Iran may have been using satellite imagery obtained from Chinese companies to help target American forces. Now, new reporting suggests that was only one part of a much broader flow of Chinese technology and equipment helping to keep Iran's war machine running. The Wall Street Journal analyzed Iranian customs records and found roughly 1,300 shipments of dual-use components from China to Iran's defense ministry this year through the end of June. That's 1,300 shipments in 6 months during the height of the US-Iran conflict. Those shipments included electronics, GPS equipment, electric motors and aircraft engine components, items that can have legitimate civilian uses, but can also be used in drones, missiles and precision-guided weapons. And the timing of some of those deliveries is notable. On June 17th, for example, the day the US and Iran agreed to a temporary truce, China was publicly touting its role in helping ease tensions and bringing the two sides together. Ah, the peacemaker. That same day, according to the Journal, an aircraft from China landed in Tehran carrying electronics. For Iran's Defense Ministry, they could be used in drones and missile guidance systems. Well, I'm sure that was helpful in bringing the two sides together. Two days later, more than a dozen additional shipments arrived, carrying more than six million dollars in components. It can be used in drones. Now, none of this necessarily means that the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party or the People's Liberation Army directly ordered or managed those shipments. We're talking plausible deniability here. Many of the companies involved are private or obscure Chinese suppliers. And China, of course, says it strictly regulates exports of dual use technology. Beijing also denies accusations that it's helping fuel the war and says its economic relationship with Iran complies with international rules. But perhaps it's worth noting, it's not likely that any Chinese company would be in the business of supplying Iran with dual use components unless they had at least the tacit approval of the Chinese government. Chinese companies tend not to go rogue at the risk of running afoul of Xi Jinping.

What the customs records show is a large and continuing Chinese supply network feeding directly into Iran's defense industry. And that network became even more important after the war began. When the US tightened its blockade of Iranian ports, Iran began dramatically increasing air cargo traffic from China. Mahan Air, the Iranian carrier sanctioned by the US for directly supporting the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, increased flights from Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou to Tehran from roughly four a week at the beginning of March to around 27 a week by the end of April. And that traffic has continued. The Journal says Mahan Air flew from China to Iran 39 times during the first week of September alone, roughly double its pre-war level. And many of those flights appear to be carrying cargo rather than passengers. So as Washington squeezed Iran's maritime trade, Tehran appears to have built an increasingly important air bridge to China.

Researchers cited by the Journal say some Chinese companies have advertised electronics known to be used in Iran's Shahed drones, the relatively cheap attack drones that Iran has repeatedly used against American bases and regional targets. Iranian customs records also show that just days before the war began, roughly 300 tons of chemical compounds arrived from China to Iran's defense ministry. China has also long been a source of sodium perchlorate, that's a chemical used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles. That became especially important after Israeli strikes in 2024, badly damaged parts of Iran's missile production infrastructure, forcing Tehran to rebuild its stockpiles and manufacturing capacity.

And there's another weapon system that Iran has apparently been trying to acquire, that would be shoulder fired surface to air missiles. The Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong-based companies that it says were involved in attempts to procure weapons for Iran, including manned portable air defense systems, known as man-pads, that could be used against American aircraft.

One network allegedly tried to route those weapons through Belarus in order to hide Iran as the ultimate customer. US officials say that that particular effort failed. But it gives us another indication of what Iran is looking for and where some of its procurement networks are operating. Then there's the satellite imagery, and we've discussed that before here on The PDB. US officials concluded that Iran obtained imagery from Chinese satellite companies before and after the July 17th attack on Muafiq's salty airbase in Jordan, an Iranian strike that killed three American troops. The US had already sanctioned several Chinese satellite imagery companies for concerns that their data could help Iran target American forces. Again, while there is evidence that Chinese companies supplied Iran with imagery and military use components, that's not the same as having evidence that Beijing ordered those companies to help Iran attack American troops. How much the Chinese government knows, tolerates or facilitates remains an important question. The Journal reviewed a letter from one sanctioned Chinese company that was trying to sell chemical materials to an Iranian linked buyer. The company reportedly said that exports required government licenses and claimed that it had coordinated with Chinese authorities to process some of those licenses confidentially. The Journal could not determine whether that particular deal was ever completed.