October 6th, 2026: Iran Is Losing Control of Its Biggest Bargaining Chip & U.S. Moves B-1 Bombers

Mike Baker (0:12)

It's Tuesday, the 6th of October. Welcome to The President's Daily Brief. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. First up, Iran's biggest bargaining chip may be starting to lose its value. As Gulf oil exports recover to pre-war levels, and pressure on the Iran-backed Houthis grows around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Later in the show, the US has pulled all of its B-1 bombers out of a key British airbase amid growing security concerns over suspected plots targeting that facility. Plus, a former Russian serviceman, accused by Ukraine of torturing prisoners of war, has been killed in a car bombing inside Russia. And in today's Back of the Brief, the FBI has arrested a woman accused of spying for China after she allegedly surveilled the U.S.-based son of Taiwan's president. But first, today's PDB Spotlight.

The Iranian regime appears to be losing control of its biggest bargaining chip. For months now, Tehran's most powerful tool has been the threat that it can pose to the Strait of Hormuz. That narrow waterway carries roughly one-fifth of the world's crude oil and liquefied natural gas. And for the beginning of this war, Iran has relied on its ability to make that traffic dangerous, unpredictable and expensive. But new shipping data suggests that leverage has now weakened considerably. According to Reuters, Gulf oil exports climbed back to pre-war levels for roughly half of September. By the end of the month, the seven-day moving average for crude exports had reached about 18.3 million barrels per day.

On 14 separate days last month, exports matched or exceeded the levels seen before the war began.

Now, liquefied natural gas shipments to the region have also recovered, reaching their highest levels since February. And that is a serious problem for the Iranian regime. Tehran's leverage was never simply that it could fire missiles or drones at ships. The leverage came from its ability to impose a major economic cost on the US, the Gulf States and the wider world by making Hormuz unreliable. If Saudi Arabia, Iraq, tanker operators and refiners can keep roughly normal volumes moving despite the danger, well, then Iran's threat obviously becomes less effective, possibly at one point becomes moot. And there is another problem built into Tehran's strategy. It's got something of an expiration date. The longer their disruption of the strait continued, the better the region has become at adapting. Saudi Arabia is moving oil through both the Gulf and the Red Sea. Iraq has secured permission from some tankers to pass through Hormuz. Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman have surged to the point that analysts say they're approaching their limits. Of course, none of this is cheap or easy. Shipping costs do remain elevated. Routes are more complicated, and the risk has not disappeared. But the important point is that the system is learning how to function around Iran's pressure campaign. And just as that is happening, well, attacks on commercial shipping are suddenly increasing. I guess we could have seen that coming. Maritime intelligence firm Mariscs says at least seven incidents were recorded in the last week. On October 1st, the Kuwaiti supertanker Kazima 3 was struck by an unknown projectile, all passing through the strait, causing a fire on board. Then on the 4th of October, the Liberian flagged tanker Lipsi was hit northeast of Oman, damaging its engine room. No casualties were reported in either of those attacks. British maritime authorities have also reported at least one attack per day in either the Strait of Hormuz or the Gulf of Aden since October 2nd.

And there's one detail in the latest reporting that does really stand out. Marisks says the pattern of attacks may not reflect Iranian forces carefully selecting individual commercial vessels. Instead, analysts say Iran may be firing missiles into a predetermined engagement area, a kind of maritime kill box, and allowing the weapons to acquire whatever radar targets are available inside that zone. We can't say with certainty that this is Iran's strategy, and we can't really know Tehran's precise motive for the recent increase in attacks, but the timing is difficult to ignore. Oil exports are recovering. LNG shipments are climbing. Gulf states are finding ways to keep commerce moving. And just as Iran's grip on Hormuz appears to be loosening, tanker attacks are becoming more frequent and potentially less discriminating.

Now, the strain of Hormuz is only half of the story. We've also been closely tracking Iran's other major pressure point on international shipping, and that would be the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, where the Houthis have spent months threatening vessels moving between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. But that strategy is now running into serious headwinds as well. Saudi-backed Jumeini forces have launched a major offensive against the Houthis, retaking positions around Dubaab and pushing back toward areas overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb. The broader operation is now openly aimed at retaking Sana'a and breaking Houthi control of Yemen's capital.