Could Iran Actually Build A Nuclear Weapon?

**Mike Baker** (0:00)
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It's Thursday, the 2nd of July. Welcome to The Presidents Daily Brief. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage.
And today, we're finishing up our series of special intelligence briefings, taking a step back briefly from the daily headlines to examine some of the biggest national security questions and geopolitical concerns currently facing the world. We'll be back to our normal daily news format, starting this afternoon with the PDB afternoon bulletin.
Today's question is one that's shaped American foreign policy, Middle East security and international diplomacy for decades. The question, is Iran pursuing a nuclear weapon? It's a question that sits at the center of one of the most consequential conflicts of recent times. It was the question that helped drive Operation Epic Fury, the military campaign launched by the US and Israel against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Supporters of the operation argued that Iran was moving steadily toward the capability to build a nuclear weapon and that military action was necessary to stop it. Critics argued that Tehran had not yet crossed that threshold and warned that military strikes could ultimately accelerate the very outcome they were designed to prevent.
But before we can evaluate whether Operation Epic Fury achieved its objectives, we first need to answer a more fundamental question. How close was Iran to a bomb in the first place?
For years, public discussions about Iran's nuclear program have often generated more heat than light. Politicians, commentators and foreign leaders routinely described Iran as being, quote, months away from a nuclear weapon, while others insisted the threat was being exaggerated. The result is that many people came away with a very unclear understanding of what Iran actually possessed and what it still lacked.
So let's start with what we know. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran had developed one of the most advanced nuclear programs in the world outside of the established nuclear weapon states. It operated thousands of centrifuges, maintained multiple enrichment facilities, and had accumulated a substantial stockpile of enriched uranium. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, Iran possessed approximately 441 kg of uranium, enriched to 60% purity before the military strikes began. Now, that's an extraordinary figure because uranium enriched to that level is already far beyond what is typically required for civilian nuclear power generation.
It's important to understand what that number does and doesn't mean. Weapons-grade uranium is generally considered to be uranium enriched to around 90% purity. Iran had not publicly reached that threshold, but nuclear experts point out that once a country reaches 60% enrichment, it's completed most of the technical work required to get there. Moving from natural uranium to 60% purity is far more difficult than moving from 60% to 90% purity. And that reality is one reason why so many governments viewed Iran's growing stockpile with alarm. The IAEA estimated that Iran's stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, if further processed, could theoretically provide enough fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons. Exactly how many depends on assumptions about weapon design and efficiency, but the point is that Iran was no longer operating a small experimental program. It had accumulated a stockpile that carried significant strategic implications.
But here's the part that often gets lost in the public debate. Having enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon is not the same thing as having a nuclear weapon. Those are two very different things, obviously. Think of it this way, possessing a large supply of aviation fuel does not mean you've built an airplane. It's an essential component, but it's only one component, and the same principle applies here. A country can possess enriched uranium without possessing a functional bomb, building a nuclear weapon requires additional steps, additional technology and additional expertise. Some of those steps are extraordinarily difficult. Others remain hidden from public view and are often the focus of intelligence collection efforts around the world. Which brings us to the central challenge facing policymakers before Operation Epic Fury. Iran had clearly mastered much of the enrichment process. It possessed significant quantities of highly enriched uranium. It had developed advanced centrifuges, and it had spent decades building nuclear expertise. What remained unclear was how close Tehran was to crossing the line from nuclear capability to an actual deployable nuclear weapon. And that's where our focus turns next. Because to understand why the US and Israel viewed Iran's program as such a serious and imminent threat, we first need to understand what it actually takes to build a bomb.