Russia plans to annex Belarus by 2030

Shirvan (0:00)

This is Alexander Lukashenko. He's been in charge of Belarus for nearly three decades. And though he is perceived as an unwavering ally of Putin, Lukashenko's political career is seemingly nearing its end. A leaked document alleges a Russian plan to annex Belarus by 2030 The annexation would take shape in three stages. First, by censoring the Belarusian identity and restraining Western influence, followed by creating a common currency and distributing Russian passports within Belarus. Until finally, by forging a universal culture where Belarusian is assimilated into the Russian identity through language, media and education. The ultimate objective is a union state no later than 2030, with Russia absorbing Belarus politically, militarily and economically. Lukashenko's response has been somewhat jumbled. He has either downplayed the annexation plan or outright denied it. Flipping the script, Lukashenko prefers to speak of brotherhood, friendship and camaraderie. Such arrangements, however, can only exist where there is parity and equilibrium. Belarus and Russia are anything but equals. They may share a border and specific cultural traits, but theirs is a relationship of unequals, much like a rock and a mountain.

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Belarus is the middle child of history. Sitting on a great European plain, the country has long been a crossroads for armies, headed for Russia via the Smolensk uplands. Historically, this precarious position meant that Belarusian identity developed intermittently, subordinated as it was to Russia's geopolitical priorities. Under the Soviet doctrine of self-determination, the Belorussian Republic had nominal independence. But this was subject to its function as a buffer state. Periods of relative liberty were followed by repressive crackdowns and cultural assimilation, and its borders were frequently redrawn to realist specifications. Nevertheless, over time, Belorussian identity became highly Sovietized, not least due to its crucial role in resisting the Nazi war machine.

Extensive post-war industrialization meant that by the time of Belorussian independence in 1991, its industrial proportion of GDP was amongst the highest in the post-Soviet world, as was its per capita income. Yet its Soviet-linked identity and dependence on Russian energy meant Belorussian nationalism was comparatively muted.

Following NATO's expansion into Poland and the Baltic states, the buffer function is as pronounced as ever, with modern Belarus being the most important state to Russian security apart from Ukraine. Thus, since the 1990s, several integration agreements have merged Belarus' military, industry, intelligence, and energy policy with that of Russia.

Absorbing Belarus into the Russian fold would yield Moscow with substantial perks. Besides bolstering Russian prestige, the addition of 9 million citizens would help offset Russia's demographic decline. Similarities of culture and language would facilitate integration and discourage Chechen-style separatism. Plus, Moscow would gain a free military hand in Belarus, something that is presently constrained by Belarusian politics and bureaucracy. By unlocking Belarus' manpower, industrial and military potential, Russia could also project power over strategic chokepoints. This would include a partial encirclement of Ukraine. It would also place the Russian army within striking distance of the Suvalki Gap, a thin, flat strip of land near Kaliningrad, which connects Poland tenuously to Lithuania.

Absorbing Belarus and merging the Belarusian KGB with the Russian FSB would furthermore strengthen Russia's intelligence network and allow it to police the frontier with NATO more effectively.

Finally, synthesis of Belarus and Russia would enable greater self-sufficiency in the face of Western sanctions. Moscow is already subsidizing Minsk to the tune of billions annually, and Russia's natural resource wealth would complement Belarusian industry.

Now, while it may be tempting to pin Russia's expansionist drive into Belarus on imperial ambitions, it was actually Lukashenko who got the ball rolling. After coming to power in Belarus in 1994, Lukashenko endorsed Boris Yeltsin's plan for a Russo-Belarusian Union. Yeltsin hoped that the project would serve as a blueprint for reigning the other post-Soviet states. Lukashenko, however, wanted to climb the Russian political hierarchy and challenge Yeltsin for the leadership of the Union state.